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I,istifta. for Advanced StudyTiiznineteenth century was an age of faith. It believed in its
ideas, it believed in its institutions, it believed in itself. Because
it was an age of faith, it was an age of miracles. Because it was an
age of miracles, it was an age of pridepride in its actual achieve-
ments and in its ultimate powers. Only here and there are there
the faint overtones of doubt, as in Kipling's Recessional and in
Henry Adams' The Virgin and the Dynamo.
On the whole the nineteenth century was a century of creation:
the empty spaces of the earth were filled; when a great empire
decayed and fell asunder, it was replaced by new and more vigor-
ous states, and in society generally new institutions were created
that served or seemed to serve human needs. Equally remarkable
perhaps were the constructive achievements of science and tech-
nology, giving man the conviction that he was at last master of
nature and of his own destiny.
In retrospect, at least, the literature of the early years of the
current century gives an impression not so much of complacency
as of fulfillment, of ultimate or penultimate realization, of ar-
rival at or just outside a desired haven. There was something of
a feeling that the giants had all been beheaded, and that the
dragons had all been slain. Not since the thirteenth century had
there been such ecumenical unanimity as to the ends of society
or as to the means of realizing those ends. There was all but
unanimous and all but universal agreement that democracy of
the American or British type was the ultimate in government;
that corporate capitalism was the ultimate in industrial organ-
ization; that the money economy under the form of the gold




called the contractual society,as distinct from the society ofcaste
or status. It was not so much the feeling that thePromised Land
had been entered as that the crossing of theJordan presentedno
more than technical difficulties.
The twentieth century to date has beena period of destruc
tion, a time of troubles, in which oldorders have beenswept
away without clearly giving place to new. It hasbeen a period
lavish in promise and niggardly in fulfillment;o questions rather
than answers; and at thepresent time our personal moodsalter-
nate between extravagant hope and equallyextravagant despair.
The trumpet sounds, but itgives forth an uncertainnote. Yet we
may suppose that new ordersare forming, and are formingout
of the old. There isvery little actual discontinuity inhistory,
though it is often difficultto see the threads by which thecon-
tinuity is maintained.
When Adam Smithwrote his Wealth 0/Nations, heselected as
the theme of his first chapterthe Division of Labor.It is com-
monplace reading today, but itwas novelty itself in 1776. Hewas
prophetic in recognizing itseconomic significance, buteven his
insight did not anticipateits socialconsequence. He saw that this
division of labor increasedthe economic potential;he did not
foresee that it wouldcreate a new type of society.With the divi- sion of labor wouldcome the money economy,and anenormous increase in the actualand relative number ofwage earners. High and low, rich andpoor, bond and free there hadalways been, but
never before had there beenan economy thatexpected the ma- jority of its peopleto be totally dependentupon the continuity of a stream ofmoney income.
Up to the time of AdamSmith, the vicissitudesof society had been attributableto acts of God and theKing's enemies. There had been devastatingwars, and there had beencycles of dearth and plenty. Butwith the moneyeconomy wouldcome cycles of another sort, equallypainful butmore humiliating, andunmiti- gated by pious submissivento the inscrutable.
The moneyeconomy is somethingquite distinct fromcapital-
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isin. America has always been capitalistic, in the sense that the
means of production have been private property. Butalmost to
the end of the nineteenth century our economy was still charac-
teristically agrarian; its gravest economic problems had arisen
at the frontier which separated the money economyfrom the
nonmoney economy of faTni and village. By the end ofthe cen-
tury Veblen could be using the wordpecuniary to describe our
society. In 1913 Wesley Mitchell published his BusinessCycles,
describing the cycle as a function of the money economy.
It is the concluding paragraphs of that work that providethe
theme of this paper: "(A) double personality (is) acquiredby citi-
zens of the money economy. Moneymaking for the individual,
business prosperity for the nation, are artificial ends of endeavor
imposed by pecuniary institutions. Beneath one lie theindivid-
ual's impulsive activitieshis maze of instinctivereactions partly
synchronized into conscious wants, definite knowledge, and pur-
poseful efforts. Beneath the other lie the vagueand conflicting
ideals of social welfare that members of each generationrefashion
after their own images. In this dim inner worldlie the ultimate
motives and meanings of action, and from it emergethe waver-
ing standards by which men judge what is for themworth while.
The money economy has not supplanted, butit has harnessed
these forces. Upon human activity andhuman ideals it has
stamped its own pattern. (How) it has facilitatedthe division of
labor, (how) it has given a pecuniary twist tothe desire for de-
struction, (how) it has shifted the basis ofpolitical power and
given rise to new social classes..-.(How) it has taught men to
think in terms of its own formal logic,efficient within certain
limits but arid when pushed to extremes. ...Economic theory
will not prove of much use .--unless it grasps the relations
among the pecuniaryinstitutions civilized man is perfecting, the
human nature he inherits from savageancestors, and the new
forces science lends to him."
This summary, in general terms,forecasts the course American
economic concern has taken overthe intervening years. This con-
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cern may be summarized as follows: the money economy at its
best has proved highly effective in providing economic satisfac-
tions for its participants. For reasons inherent not in itself, but
in its institutions, it has proved highly unstable. This instability
has been economically costly, and at times socially intolerable.
The concrete objective was to reduce the instability. Academi-
cally speaking, this suggected an increased emphasis on monetary
economics. It may be noted pare'tica1ly that no question was
raised as to the general economic structure; and this premise has
been retained down to the present.
It is now the intent of this paper to trace, in parallel, the se-
quence of legislative and administrative actions taken with ref-
erence to the control of the money economy, with some reference
to the interaction of academic thought and political action. The
catalogue is by no means complete, but it may be illustrative.
The most recent American experience had been the Panic of
1907. The Panic of 1907 was not an act of God or the King's
enemies, as the old phrase had run. It was not part of the cycle of
dearth and plenty described by Sir William Petty a century and
a half earlier. It was of human causation, the consequence of a
failure of human institutions, or of human error in the operation
of human institutions; and these institutions were financial.
The first effort to control the business cycle took the form ofa
specific attack upon its most conspicuous and violent phase,
namely, the financial crisis or panic. The remedy suggested,ap-
proved, and legislated was the creation ofa centralized reserve
banking system. In this measure, it is true,we were but adopting
an established European mechanism; and since its establishment,
there has been no recurrence of thetype of monetary crisis that
had previously been a recurring element of theAmerican cycle.
The experience of 1919-21 illustrated the fact that thepreven-
tion of the financial crisis or panic phase didnot eliminate the
cycle; and three lessons were drawn from it byAmerican econo-
mists: first, that monetary action by theReserve banks might,
could, or should be taken with referenceto domestic considera-
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tions, without regard to what inEuropean experience had been
the principal guide to such actionnamely,the state of the for-
eign exchanges; second, theapparent economic response in 1922
to the appearance of low money rates encourageda belief in the
causative power of chearimoney as a force in itself; and third,
the disastrous commo4ity pricemovements that characterized
that particular cycle turned attentionto the control of the price
level as the "eg1c point of the general campaignof cyclical
c'aro1.
In short, this experience was construedas throwing on the
formal monetary machinerythe Reserve Systemtheresponsi-
bility not merely for preventing financial panics, but ofmanaging
the domestic money economy with referenceto the moderation if
not the elimination of the cycle. The experience of the United
States as well as the concurrent experiences of Europe, bothset
forth with an amplitude of statistical detail formerly unavailable
to economists, reinforced belief in the quantity theory of money
and the efficacy of the discount rate as a mechanism for control-
ling the quantity of money, by controlling its price. Thenov-
elty of this monetary doctrine lay in its shift of emphasis from
the position of the currency on the foreign exchangesto the rela-
tion of the monetary system to the domesticeconomy. The experi-
ence of the years 1921.29 supported these views. In that time, the
price level was noticeably stable, and the fluctuations in the vol-
ume of production were small. It is true that the Reserve System
resisted perennial attempts to legislate a directive requiring it to
control the price level; but the belief that the cycle had been
mastered by monetary technique was widely accepted both in
America and abroad. Conspicuous evidence of such faith is af-
forded by the capitalization of common stocks in that perioda
capitalization valid only on the assumption that the cycle had
been either eliminated or brought under practical control. This
belief was perhaps even more strongly held in Europe, which,
somewhat enviously, could not fail to remark that this type of
monetary control could be exercised only by a country that was
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not constrained by the position of its currency on the foreign
exchanges. Although we were on the gold standard, our mone-
tary policy was administered indepeiidently of gold inflow and
outflow; and, somewhat paradoxically, our experience impressed
many foreign economists with the advantages of a currency that
could be administered outside the restraints of that standard. It
is in this period that the term 'managed currency' or the 'man-
aged gold standard' came into use, with only a partial realiza-
tion of the fact that the gold standard could be managed only by
a country that was dominant on the exchanges.
It must not be supposed that this policy was as clear at the time
as it is in retrospect. Indeed, there was a substantial deviation
from it in 1927; but the criticism at the timeand stillstronger
subsequentlyindicated the strength of the feeling that the
primary loyalty and responsibility of the central bank laytoward
the domestic economy.
Following the crash of 1929, the techniques that hadseem
ingly been effective in 1922 were rapidly, vigorously,and confi-
dently applied. It was asserted and believed that businesswas
fundamentally sound, and the price level impregnable.The area
of excess had been the stock market, and this hadbeen liquidated.
For the economy in general, theworst that could be expected was
a brief, mild recession, due to psychological shock. Openmarket
operations quickly retired the burdensomediscounts, rates were
rapidly reduced, and the public, theacademic community, and
the government alike expected thesequence of recovery and
stability. The sequencewas quite different.
It uncovered a defect in the dogma_-inthis instance, the doc-
nine of the marginal borrower. Allcredit theories at the time
postulated the perpetual existenceof the marginal borrower
the borrower who was excluded fromthe market as ratesrose and
admitted as rates fell. As therehad been no expansion inbank
loans or deposits for monthspreceding the crash, whenrates had
been high, few doubted theappearance of the marginal bor-
rower as the stabilizing force whenrates fell. The marginal
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borrower failed to appear and the depression ran its course, with
commodity prices falling from their brief plateau nearly a far as
ten years before they had dropped from their postwar peak. As in
the earlier period, the price level became the focal point of
thought on the cycle and its control; and the restoration of the
ptice level became the objective of monetary action.
Both England and the United States adopted similar measures,
although they were described in different phrases. England de-
preciated the pound in terms of gold and of several currencies
that retained a fixed gold nexus. As a sequel, the fall in the British
price index was arrested while the fall in so-called gold prices
continued. Whereupon the United States and eventually France
depreciated their currencies by revaluing gold, and thus returned
sterling to something like its original exchange relation. The two
sections of the Western World were so evenly balanced that each
could use the other as a fulcrum. l'he part played by this maneu-
ver in arresting the downward phase of prices is differently eval-
uated in England and in America. In England it is regarded as
a major contribution to the technique of cyclical control; in
America it is usually considered as a form of economic warfare,
of doubtful efficacy in domestic affairs and at best merely capa-
ble of shifting economic impacts from the domestic to some
foreign quarter. It is conceivable that both appraisals are correct
for their respective countries.
The devaluation of the dollar did not achieve its objective of
raising commodity prices although there was wide anticipation
of the prospective price rise by both those who hoped for it and
those who feared it. The expectation of neither was fulfilled. The
objective officially remained, and the next method, while stated
in somewhat novel phraseology, was more conventional. The
quantity of money was to be refiated to the predepression level,
and under the canons of the quantity theory this would restore
the status quo ante, for both prices and production. In this refla-


























The sequel gave a limited confirmation to this thesis. The
quantity of money was readily raised to or above the level of
the 'twenties; there was a considerable recovery of production
and some advance in prices. By early 1937 the American economy
had attained what in comparison with 1932 was a considerable
measure of recovery, or even prosperity, except that at its best
unemployment continued at a level previously associated with
the depths of cyclical depression. It appeared that while the
quantity of money had been increased, its statistical average turn-
over remained low; or, put another way, a part of the money was
alleged to have a normal velocity and a part no velocity at all.
This phenomenon was described as oversavingthat is, money
saving that was abstracted from consumption and not returned
to the income stream of investment. Two explanations were
forthcoming: the doctrine of the mature economy in this coun-
try, and in England the theory that economic equilibrium might
be attained without the full use of resources. Oddly enough, the
mature economy thesis never won much following in England,
which was obviously the more mature; while the submerged
equilibrium doctrine won little support here since thesequence
quickly demonstrated that our economy was not in equilibrium.
The general consequence was to shift the emphasis of economic
thought to the national income, rather than to the price level
or the quantity of money.
The abrupt collapse in 1957-38 was met with what hadnow
become the standard cyclical controllowermoney rates and
more Government borrowing, with Government no longeras the
marginal borrower, but as virtually the sole borrower,either of
bank credit or of savings. The recovery had beenbut partial and
hesitant when our economy was launched intoan armament pro-
gram which presently merged with the war boom.
The changes introduced during thewar seem novel, and at the
time they were introduced were consideredtemporary, especially
in this country. A surprising proportionof them, however, have
roots running well back into the prewar period.Many of the di.
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red controls over the economy havebeen removed, others will be
removed; but it is a fair guess that many will be long retained
and some even reinstated. Generally speaking, those that were
removed pertained to physical production and distribution;
those that have been retained, related to the money economy.For
example, WPB was disbanded, OPA was retained; rationing was
abandoned, but the pattern of interest rates was retained. Federal
wage fixing was introduced duringthe war, and has been so
extended since that the term collective bargaining not onlyrefers
to negotiations betweenemployer and employee, but between
leaders of organized labor and the White House.In short, virtu-
ally every element of the money economy is nowdirectly allocated
to the control of some agencyin Washington., The interest rate,
wholesale prices, retail prices, farm prices, wagesin important
industries and minimum wages in general, are all areasassigned
to control, although thecontrol is of uneven effectiveness. It is
now almost rare for two persons to engagein any sort of money
transaction but some agency of government is aninterested party.
Meanwhile, events had occurred that necessitatedthe aban-
donrnent of some of the earlier principles. TheFederal Reserve
System had been the agency of cyclicalcontrol, and its most
trusted mechanism had been the discount rate.The essence of
management had1 been the ability ofthe central bank to dominate
the market rate of interest by its controlof the quantity of money,
whether its action was dictated by theexigencies of the foreign
exchanges or by the indicatedrequirements of the domestic
economy. Under the newcircumstances, resulting from war
finance, the magnitude of the publicdebt in the aggiegate, the
amount held in the banks,and the rate pattern on which its value
rests, now largely determinethe limits of Federal Reserve action.
It can no longer use its control over ratesand over the quantity
of money for the purpose ofcontrolling the business cycle. Both
are consideredprimarily, one might say, solely withreference to
the public debt. Concurrently,there has been a marked change





prices and the volume of production. The dogma of the quantit)
of money as the great determinant of both has given way, in some
quarters, to an almost equally emphaticdenial that it is related
to either. The overriding fact of thepublic debt hasthus de facto
altered the status of the Reserve System. It has become merely
one of the many agencies in Washington charged with a frag.
mentary responsibility for administering a sector of the money
economy. It is remarkable that the only agency in Washington
with any extended experience or tradition in the problems of the
money economy has been relegated to what is hardly more than
an advisory capacity. Or one could put this idea another way
that the public debt has come to dominate the quantity of money.
Thus a train of events, set in motion by the legislation follow.
ing the Panic of 1907, comes to its logical conclusionor rather it
comes to one of several conclusions that might have been logical
almost forty years later. The Panic of 1907 made Americans
acutely aware of the social catastrophes inherent in the fluctua.
tions of the money economy, or rather in the money economy by
reason of its instability. To protect themselves from these catas-
trophes they have created a succession of institutions charged
with prescribed responsibilities toward the moneyeconomy.
From the initial responsibility of no more than averting the
panic or crisis phase of the cycle, these responsibilities have been
enlarged until they embrace every aspect of themoney economy,
and find their most recent expression in legislation whichpro-
poses not only to eliminate the cycle but also to stabilize the
economy at a level marked by full employment of human and
material resources. Specific Government agenciesarmed with
seemingly adequate powersare provided to stabilize the price
level, the interest rate, the level of employment,and the national
incomewhich last is the ultimate statisticalexpression of the
money economy. The control of themoney economy, at once
centralized and fragmentary, is complete.After forty years of
marchingmuch of the time ina wildernesswe stand again on
the banks of the Jordan.
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For the economist it might seem as if he had ratherreached the
Pillars of Hercules. All the giants are dead, all thedragons are
slain, all the problems solved, and all the questionsanswered.
But part of the quotation given earlier is relevant:"money mak-
ing for the individual, business prosperityfor the nation, are
artificial ends of endeavor imposed by pecuniaryinstitutions.
Beneath one lie the individuals impulsive activitieshis maze
of instinctive reactions...Beneath the other lie the vague and
conflicting ideals of social welfare that members ofeach genera-
tion refashion in their own images. In thisdim inner world lie
the ultimate motives and meanings of action,and from it emerge
the waning standards by which menjudge what is for them
worthwhile."
The validity of any theory depends uponits major premise.
To Adam Smith the majorpremise was the capacity of the free
market to perform the equilibratingadjustments required to
make economic existence viable. Thispremise was from the first
disputed by the vagaries of the money economy, asthey affected
the relationships of an intricatelycontractual society; and, in the
end, the market was repudiatedor seemsto be in process of
rejectionby reason of the empirical factthat after 1914 it
appeared increasingly unable to performthis function.
The major premise of contemporarymonetary economics is
the capacity of state controlof the money system to makethe
equilibrating adjustments required tomake economic existence
viable. It was accepted as analternative to the incapacities of the
market; it proved extremelyefficacious in war finance, but its
application or applicability to peace overtime is untested. We
know now that AdamSmith ignored or underestimatedthe
money economy as anintruder capable of disturbing and eventu-
ally destroying theequilibrating function of the market.Control
of the money economyoccupies in contemporary economicsthe
same fundamentalplace that the market did toAdam Smith. Is it
conceivable that somewherein the dim inner world of ultimate
motives and meanings of actionthere lurks the intruder that will
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prevent state control of the money system from performing the
equilibrating function? In short, the market system of Adam
Smith failed because apparently it could not bear the social
responsibility that was heaped on it. The weight of social respon.
sibility now laid on state control of the money economy is in.
finitely heavier.
The past has a curious way of intruding into the present. The
last economist to use Sir William Petty's phraseology of "cycles
of dearth and plenty" was Maithus; and in the interval we were
repeatedly told that the technology of man had proved superior
to what earlier writers had devoutly if somewhat irreverently
called acts of God. Our only problem was for the mind of man to
overcome human shortcomings. Monetary economics promised
one answer to this final problem. It is a bit mocking that its first
test comes during a cycle of dearth, in which the money economy
finds itself literally impotent. But it serves to remindus that there
may still be factors in heaven and earth undreamed of in our
philosophy of the money economy, and that still lie in the"maze
of instinctive reactions of the individual", and "the diminner
world of social standards and motivations".
To us as individuals and as students of economics thereare no
pillars of Hercules. No American college hasyet carved over its
door the motto 'ne plus ultra'. Weare still permitted to be stu
dents seeking wisdom and pursuing it, andfinding it, whether
in the pages of Adam Smith's Wealth ofNations, of Karl Marx's
Capital, or of Lord Keynes' Treatiseon Money. We, as students,
may adopt for our own guidance the concludingpassage of this
year's annual report prepared by theneDirector of Research of
the National Bureau: to "continueto focus attention on the large
issues concerning the production,exchange, and distribution of
wealth, substitute as faras possible facts for speculation, remain
critical of our work, strive steadilyto improve it, and cooperate
with others. If our zeal and industryremain strong,we shall not
fail to render a definite serviceto our own generation andto the
generations that come after us."
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